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Abstract 
 
Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple 
games: the Deegan– Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these 
indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar 
arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into 
account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results 
obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world 
examples taken from the political field. 
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1. Introduction 
In the field of political science, the study of the a priori distribution of power in a voting 
body has a main role. A particular class of Transferable Utility (TU) games, the simple 
games, can be used to model the decision-making process. Different power indices have 
been suggested in order to assess the a priori distribution of power among the players.    
A power index gives a measure of the ability that players have to transform a losing 
coalition into a winning one. We arise far from consensus over the issue of choice of an 
appropriate power index in a given context, and several power indices are   employed. 
The main power indices of the literature include the Shapley– Shubik index [7], the 
Banzhaf index [2], the Deegan– Packel index [3] and the Public Good Index [4]. The first 
two power indices are based on vulnerable winning coalition. A winning coalition is 
vulnerable when it has at least one member whose removal would cause the resulting 
coalition to be a losing coalition. An agent is considered critical when his elimination from 
a winning coalition turns this coalition into a losing coalition. In Banzhaf’s model, the 
power of an agent is proportional to the number of coalitions in which he is   critical. 
A minimal winning coalition is one such that all its members are critical. According 
to Deegan and Packel [3], only minimal winning coalitions should be considered in 
establishing the power of a voter. They assume that all minimal winning coalitions are 
 
 
  
equiprobable and all the voters in a minimal winning coalition divide the spoils equally. 
With this assumption, they define the Deegan– Packel index. Holler [4] proposes that only 
minimal winning coalitions should be considered when it comes to measuring power and 
the outcome is a public good and he defines the Public Good Index. The Public Good Index 
is determined by the number of minimal winning coalitions containing the voter divided 
by the sum of such numbers across all the  voters. 
Several desirable properties have been introduced in the context of power indices. In 
this paper, some of these properties will be mentioned, as well as some characterizations of 
the main power indices according to them. We define two modifications of the Deegan– 
Packel index and two modifications of the Public Good Index. Although it will not be 
discussed which index is most appropriate, two real-world examples taken from the 
political field are used to compare the results obtained with different power indices. We 
should mention that issues related to those of this paper have been studied by Pinto   [6]. 
 
2. Simple games 
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this index, we use an argument similar to that employed to Holler to define the Public 
Good Index. Using a parallel argument to that used by Deegan and Packel, we could define 
an index similar to Deegan– Packel index and it is given by the  formula 
 
 
 
as the power index f 0, g0 satisfies efficiency, null player and symmetry. 
 
3.1 Example: The Portuguese Parliament 
In  this  subsection,  we  apply  the  previous  indices  to  the  Portuguese   Parliament  
(IX Legislature 2002): 
 
Parties Members 
PPD/PSD (player 1) 105 
PS (player 2) 96 
CDS/PP (player 3) 14 
PCP (player 4) 10 
BE (player 5) 3 
PEV (player 6) 2 
 
This Parliament can be seen as a weighted game, where the weights of each player 
coincides with his number of members. The Portuguese Parliament is constituted by  230 
members and the quota is equal to 116. We have a total of 64 coalitions. First, we list the 
33 losing coalitions (each player is identified with the previous numbers): Y, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
14, 15, 16, 23, 24, 25, 26, 34, 35, 36, 45, 46, 56, 156, 235, 236, 245, 246, 256, 345,   346, 
356, 456, 2356, 2456, 3456. 
The 31 winning coalitions are: 12, 13, 123, 124, 125, 126, 134, 135, 136, 145, 146, 
234, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1245, 1246, 1256, 2345, 2346, 1345, 1346, 1356, 1456, 12345, 
12346, 12356, 12456, 13456, 23456, N. 
The five minimal winning coalitions are: 12, 13, 145, 146,  234. 
It is easy to prove that a player is null if and only if he does not belong to none of the 
minimal winning coalitions. Then, in this case, the set of null players is empty. Then, f 
coincides with f 0, and g coincides with g0, because the sets Wi  v and WNPi  v are equal, 
for every player i. 
Player 1 belongs to two minimal winning coalitions of size 2 and to two minimal 
winning coalitions of size 3. Players 2 and 3 belong to one minimal wining coalition of 
size 2 and to one minimal winning coalition of size 3. Player 4 belongs to three minimal 
winning coalitions of size 3. Finally, players 5 and 6 belong to one minimal winning 
coalition of size 3. 
The Deegan– Packel index is equal to (0.333; 0.167; 0.167; 0.2; 0.067;  0.067). 
The Public Good Index is equal to (0.307; 0.153; 0.153; 0.231; 0.076; 0.076).    
Player 1 belongs to two winning coalitions of size 2, to nine winning coalitions of size 
3, to 10 winning coalitions of size 4, to five winning coalitions of size 5 and to a winning 
coalition of size 6. Players 2 and 3 belong to a winning coalition of size 2, to 5 winning 
coalition of size 3, to eight winning coalitions of size 4, to 5 winning coalitions of size 5 
and to a winning coalition of size 6. Player 4 belongs to five winning coalition of size 3, to 
eight winning coalitions of size 4, to five winning coalitions of size 5 and to a winning 
  
coalition of size 6. Finally, players 5 and 6 belong to three winning coalition of size 3, to 
seven winning coalitions of size 4, to five winning coalitions of size 5 and to a winning 
coalition of size 6. 
The indices f and f 0  are equal to (0.228; 0.169; 0.169; 0.161; 0.136;  0.136). 
The indices g and g 0  are equal to (0.215; 0.172; 0.172; 0.156; 0.126; 0.126). 
 
3.2 Example: The Council of the European Union 1958 – 1972 
In this subsection, we apply the previous indices to the Council of the European Union 
(1958 – 1972): 
 
Countries Votes 
France (player 1) 4 
Germany (player 2) 4 
Italy (player 3) 4 
Belgium (player 4) 2 
Netherlands (player 5) 2 
Luxembourg (player 6) 1 
 
As the previous example, the Council of European Union can be seen as a weighted 
game. In this case, the total of votes is 17 and the quota is equal to 12. There are 14 
winning coalitions: 123, 1245, 1345, 2345, 1236, 23456, 12456, 13456, 1234, 1235, 
12346, 12356, 12345, N. 
In this case, there are four minimal winning coalitions: 123, 1245, 1345, 2345. 
Luxembourg is a null player because it does not belong to any minimal winning coalition. 
There are seven quasi-winning coalitions: 123, 1245, 1345, 2345, 1234, 1235, 12345. 
Then, f does not coincide with f 0, and g does not coincide with g 0. 
Taking into account that France, Germany and Italy have four votes, they are 
symmetric players, Belgium and Netherlands are symmetric, too. In this case, as the non-
null players belong to the same number of minimal winning coalitions, the Public Good 
Index of these countries coincide. 
The Deegan– Packel index is equal to (0.208; 0.208; 0.208; 0.188; 0.188;  0). 
The Public Good Index is equal to (0.2; 0.2; 0.2; 0.2; 0.2;   0). 
The index f is equal to (0.190; 0.190; 0.190; 0.159; 0.159;   0.111). 
The index g is equal to (0.196; 0.196; 0.196; 0.155; 0.155;   0.101). 
The index f 0  is equal to (0.214; 0.214; 0.214; 0.179; 0.179; 0). 
The index g0 is equal to (0.219; 0.219; 0.219; 0.171; 0.171; 0). 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation and 
FEDER through Project ECO2008-03484-C02-02/ECON, from the FPU program of the Spanish 
Ministry of Science and Innovation, from Fundac¸a˜o Calouste Gulbenkian and from Programs POCTI 
and POCI by FCT and MCTES. F. Ferreira thanks ESEIG/IPP and CMUP for their financial support. 
A.A. Pinto also thanks Centro de Matema´tica da Universidade do Minho for its financial support. 
 
References 
[1] J.M. Alonso-Meijide, B. Casas-Me´ndez, M.J. Holler, and S. Lorenzo-Freire, Computing power 
indices: Multilinear extensions and new characterizations, European J. Oper. Res. 188 (2008), 
pp. 540 – 554. 
  
[2] J.F. Banzhaf, Weighted voting doesn’t work: A mathematical analysis, Rutgers Law Rev. 19 
(1965), pp. 317 – 343. 
[3] J. Deegan and E.W. Packel, A new index of power for simple n-person games, Internat. J. Game 
Theory 7 (1979), pp. 113 – 123. 
[4] M.J.  Holler,  Forming  coalitions  and  measuring  voting  power,  Polit.  Stud.  30  (1982),   
pp. 262 – 271. 
[5] S.   Lorenzo-Freire,   J.M.   Alonso-Meijide,   B.   Casas-Me´ndez,   and   M.G.   Fiestras-Janeiro, 
Characterizations of the Deegan– Packel and Johnston power indices, European J. Oper. Res. 
177 (2007), pp. 431 – 434. 
[6] A.A. Pinto, Game Theory and Duopoly Models, Interdisciplinary Applied Mathematics Series, 
Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, accepted 2009. 
[7] L.S. Shapley and M. Shubik, A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee 
system, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 48 (1954), pp. 787 – 792. 
[8] H.P. Young, Monotonic solutions of cooperative games, Internat. J. Game Theory 14 (1985), 
pp. 65 – 72. 
